No change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war. OSW Study 47/2014 by Gorecki, Wojciech
N O  C H A N G E  I N  T H E  R U S S I A N  
C A U C A S U S
T H E  W I N T E R  O L Y M P I C S  A M I D  A  L O C A L  W A R
W o j c i e c h  G ó r e c k i
4 7
NO CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN 
CAUCASUS 





© Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies
CONTENT EDITORS












Wojciech Górecki (painting by Alexander Novoselov, from the collection  






Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 
Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland
Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00




KEY POINTS  /5
INTrOduCTION /8
I. ThE gEOgraPhICal aNd hISTOrICal CONTExT /9
II. ThE CIvIl war /13
1. Parties to the conflict and their aims /13
2. The Caucasus Emirate /15
2.1. Origins /15
2.2. Structures /18
2.3. Evolving tactics /20
3. Federal and local security forces /25
4. Consequences for the region /26
III. SITuaTION IN ThE NOrTh CauCaSuS SubjECTS  
OF ThE ruSSIaN FEdEraTION /29
IV. ThE rOlE OF azErbaIjaN aNd gEOrgIa /49
V. CulTural aNd CIvIlISaTIONal ChaNgES /53
VI. ThE NOrTh CauCaSuS IN MOSCOw’S POlICIES /58
1. Strategies towards the region /58
2. Operation Sochi 2014 /63
VII. CONCluSIONS aNd TENTaTIvE FOrECaST:  

























the	Caucasus	Emirate,	 a	decentralised	 terror	organisation	established	 in	












fore	 these	 lands	were	 incorporated	 into	Russia.	Finally	a	process	of	de-
Russification	is	visible,	whereby	the	Caucasus	languages	are	pushing	out	
Russian	and	 the	knowledge	of	Russian	 is	declining.	There	 is	 a	 growing	
sense	of	mutual	alienation	between	the	North	Caucasus	and	the	rest	of	




































































of	sharia	 into	 the	 local	 legislation;	he	has,	however,	 taken	action	against	
Salafi	Islam.
•	 The	North	Caucasus	 is	 the	poorest	region	of	Russia,	with	 the	highest	re-






















































I. ThE gEOgraPhIcal aNd hISTOrIcal cONTExT






gea,	 Karachay-Cherkessia,	 Kabardino-Balkaria,	 North	 Ossetia,	 Ingushetia,	
Chechnya	and	Dagestan),	two	krais	(Krasnodar	and	Stavropol)	and	one	oblast	
(Rostov	Oblast,	with	the	capital	 in	Rostov-on-Don).1	 It	spans	an	area	of	more	
than	 350,ooo	 km2	 (around	 2%	 of	 Russia’s	 territory),	 and	 has	 a	 population	 of	
nearly	20	million	people	(around	13.6%	of	Russia’s	total	population).
The	lands	of	the	North	Caucasus	are	located	in	two	federal	districts:2	the	North	








































Russia	only	 in	the	second	half	of	 the	19th	century,	several	decades	 later	 than	
the	lands	of	today’s	Georgia,	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan.	This	was	due	to	strong	











































The	breaking	up	of	 the	Circassian	ethnos	 (proper	name:	Adyghe)	 into	 three	
groups	is	a	case	in	point:	it	was	intended	to	lead	over	time	to	the	formation	of	
three	small	nations	 in	the	place	of	one	as	a	result	of	deepening	ethnograph-
ic	 and	 linguistic	 differences.	 Three	 territorial	 units,	 i.e.	 Adygea,	 Karachay-
-Cherkessia	and	Kabardino-Balkaria,	were	established	in	the	Circassian	lands,	
and	in	addition	the	Circassians	had	to	share	two	of	them	with	the	Caucasian	














ale.	 During	 the	 second	 Chechen	War	 (1999–2009,	 regular	 armed	 operations	






















































II. ThE cIvIl war
































































secular	 and	 to	 remain	within	 the	Russian	Federation	 for	pragmatic	 reasons	























































ris	Yeltsin,	 the	 then	president	of	Russia	who	was	 responsible	 for	 starting	 the	
war,	liked	to	present	himself	as	a	democrat),	and	‘independence’,	perceived	in	
the	context	of	pauperisation,	the	lack	of	prospects	and	rising	crime,	including	
kidnappings	 for	 ransom,	more	 and	more	Chechens	began	 to	 cherish	 the	 idea	
of	building	a	‘just’	Islamic	republic	in	Chechnya.	The	idea	was	popular	in	par-








17	 Many	 commanders	 operated	 at	 the	 intersection	of	 politics,	 business	 and	mafia.	 Some	of	
them	were	members	of	the	Chechen	parliament	and	had	registered	businesses,	but	the	larg-
















Aslan	 Maskhadov	 himself	 indirectly	 contributed	 to	 the	 strengthening	 of	
Salafism.	The	 president	was	 an	 advocate	 of	 a	 secular	Chechnya,	 but	 having	
failed	to	subordinate	the	former	commanders	or	to	force	al-Khattab	and	the	




Contrary	 to	 his	 declared	 intentions	 (reconciliation	 and	 national	 unity),	
Maskhadov’s	decisions	only	entrenched	the	marginalisation	of	the	secularists	















Another	 development	 that	 aided	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 armed	 Islamic	 under-

























decision	 to	 formally	 hand	 over	 power	 in	 Chechnya	 to	 ‘pro-Russian’	 Chech-
en	politicians.22	The	aim	of	 that	process,	which	commentators	referred	to	as	








The	Kadyrovs	adhere	 to	 traditional	 Islam	and	 they	considered	 the	Salafis	 to	
be	their	main	enemy.	This	has	enabled	them	to	convince	a	considerable	pro-
portion	of	 the	militants,	 those	who	were	motivated	by	national	 rather	 than	












22	 As	 numerous	 cases	 demonstrate,	 being	 ‘pro-Russian’	 is	 often	 only	 a	 tactic	 for	 Chechen	
politicians.	For	example,	referring	to	the	current	Chechen	leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov	as	pro-
Russian	would	be	a	simplification	obscuring	a	much	more	complex	reality	(see	the	box	on	





edge	of	 the	 terrain	and	 the	 local	 social	 relations,	 to	 take	part	 in	 the	military	operations	
offered	a	chance	to	more	effectively	eliminate	the	militants.





























































































Syria,	 the	Caucasus	ceased	 to	be	attractive	 for	 such	people	as	a	place	where	
they	could	fight	against	the	‘enemies	of	Islam’.	Secondly,	the	role	of	the	muja-
hideen	in	the	Emirate	has	been	gradually	diminishing.	After	al-Khattab	died	






Екатерина Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет Ингушетия сделала огромный рывок, но работы 













































and	 Dagestan,	 Eastweek	 OSW,	 22.02.2012.	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2012-02-22/clashes-border-chechnya-and-dagestan	












































2009–2011.36	 They	 included	 the	 attempt	 at	 assassinating	 the	 president	 of	 In-
gushetia,	Yunus-Bek	Yevkurov	(on	22	June	2009,	Yevkurov	survived	but	two	




































The	Emirate	has	demonstrated	 its	 ability	 to	destabilise	 the	 situation	 in	are-
as	close	 to	 the	Olympic	 facilities	 (the	attacks	 in	Kabardino-Balkaria),	which	


















































































































that	 an	Emirate	 cell	was	behind	 the	bombing	 although	 the	Emirate	has	not	




44	 Умаров призвал вооруженное подполье к срыву Олимпиады в Сочи,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	
3.07.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/226558/
	 The	militant	leader	has	called	the	Games	‘satanic’	as	they	are	being	organised	“on	the	bones	













































sia	at	that	time.	Владимир Мухин, Бессилие антитеррора, Независимая Газета,	31.03.2010.	
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-03-31/1_antiterror.html
48	 A	 year	 earlier,	 the	 Russian	 Internal	 Troops	 had	 170,000	 soldiers.	 Анатолий Цыганок, 


























conflict	 (unlike	 the	 Interior	Ministry	 forces).	This	 situation	could	change	 in	
the	future,	though.
The	 siloviki	 have	 been	 combatting	 the	 armed	 underground	 by	 carrying	 out	
“anti-terror	operations”	which	can	take	different	forms	depending	on	the	lo-
cation	(the	 ‘liquidation’	of	militants	 in	residential	buildings	in	city	districts,	
blockades	 of	 entire	 villages	 and	 systematic	 searches	 for	 people	 in	 hiding	 or	
arms	depots	in	the	case	of	mountain	settlements,	or	attacks	on	Emirate	hidea-










51	 They	 turned	out	 to	be	poorly	prepared	 for	fighting	 in	 the	mountains	and	suffered	 losses	
in	 those	 operations.	Источник: подразделения Минобороны спустя 6 лет привлекли 
к боевым действиям в Чечне, уже 4 жертвы,	Gazeta.ru,	8.10.2012.	http://www.gazeta.ru/
social/news/2012/10/08/n_2561873.shtml










































54	 ФСБ: в 2013 году в РФ зафиксировано 144 террористических проявления, из них 120 – 
в Дагестане,	Kavkaz-uzel,	8.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231311/	
	 Another	high-ranking	 representative	 of	 the	NAK,	Evgeny	 Ilin,	 said	 in	October	 2013	 that	
more	than	98%	of	all	terrorist	crimes	were	committed	in	the	North	Caucasus	federal	dis-
trict.	На СКФО приходится 98% терактов в России – НАК,	Ekhokavkaza,	14.10.2013.	http://
www.ekhokavkaza.org/articleprintview/25136341.html
55	 The	North	 Caucasus:	 The	 Challenges	 of	 Integration	 (III),	 Governance,	 Elections,	 Rule	 of	









































































III. SITuaTION IN ThE NOrTh caucaSuS SubjEcTS  
OF ThE ruSSIaN FEdEraTION



















project	by	 the	Levada	Centre,	 the	armed	conflict	 is	not	 the	greatest	cause	of	
concern	for	people	in	the	region	–	it	is	instead	unemployment	and	poverty.66	
60	 OSW	interview	with	a	Chechen	political	scientist,	June	2013.
61	 Екатерина Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет Ингушетия сделала огромный рывок, но 
работы еще много,	Mir24,	11.03.2013.	http://mir24.tv/news/politics/6648308
62	 According	 to	 Rosstat	 (Федеральная служба государственной статистики,	 the	 Federal	





























eral	 elections	 of	 governors	were	 restored	 in	Russia	 after	 eight	 years	 during	
which	leaders	of	Federation	subjects	were	nominated,68	with	individual	sub-
jects	of	the	Federation	being	offered	an	opt-out).	On	8	September	2013,	i.e.	the	













































In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2013,	 the	 average	 salary	 in	 Dagestan	 was	 16,676	 roubles	





















71	 These	 and	 other	 unemployment	 figures	 quoted	 after	 http://xn----8sbcbbscql7bijpi7ac0e-
weh.xn--p1ai/





















































































In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2013,	 the	 average	monthly	 salary	 amounted	 to	 15,096	 rou-













































rov’s	autocratic	rule,	 in	 turn,	has	been	made	possible	due	 to	 the	changes	 that	














In	 the	medium	 term,	 and	 especially	 the	 long	 term,	 the	 ambitions	 of	 the	
































Kadyrov	has	been	able	 to	 reach	his	 current	position	due	 to	 the	policy	of	
Chechenisation.82	 Initially,	 his	 independence	 was	 limited	 by	 influential	
groups	in	Chechnya,	which	also	advocated	co-operation	with	Moscow.	Over	





Magomed	Kakiyev	and	Sulim	Yamadayev,	had	good	 links	 in	 the	Russian	
Ministry	of	Defence	(while	Kadyrov	at	that	time	was	believed	to	be	a	protégé	
of	the	Interior	Ministry	and	the	FSB).	The	two	battalions	were	disbanded	
as	 a	 result	 of	 actions	 taken	by	Kadyrov,	who	 accused	 their	 commanders	
and	soldiers	of	a	number	of	offences,	and	even	sent	an	arrest	warrant	for	
Yamadayev.84	By	2011,	Kadyrov	had	no	major	opponents	left	in	the	republic	






82	 Chechenisation	 is	 discussed	 in	more	 detail	 in	 the	 section	 on	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 Caucasus	
Emirate.






















































Watch	 (World	 Report	 2013):	 http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/
russia?page=2
87	 Since	2010,	new	soldiers	 for	battalions	come	 from	the	draft	–	Chechen	recruits	have	not	
served	 in	military	units	 outside	Chechnya	 since	 1992. Власти Чечни приняли решение 
























islation	 and	 legal	 practice,	 including	 restrictions	 on	 the	 sale	 of	 alcohol	
(which	can	be	bought	 legally	only	between	8.00	and	 10.00	a.m.	 in	a	 few,	
selected	stores)	and	the	obligation	for	 female	officials,	 television	anchors	
and	 students	 to	wear	headscarves.	There	are	 two	 religious	academies	 in	
Chechnya,	including	the	Kunta	Haji	Russian	Islamic	University	in	Grozny	
and	 the	 Akhmad	 Kadyrov	 Islamic	 Institute	 in	 Kurchaloy),	 20	madrasas	
(high	 schools),	 as	well	 as	 four	hafiz	 schools,	 i.e.	 schools	 for	Quran	 recit-
ers	(in	October	2013	the	construction	of	a	fifth	was	launched).90	There	are	








Due	 to	activity	of	 this	 type,	 the	Chechen	 leader	enjoys	genuine	popular-


















92	 OSW	 interview	with	Professor	Alexei	Malashenko,	 June	2011.	 It	 should	be	expected	 that	
when	the	generation	which	does	not	remembers	the	war,	i.e.	those	born	after	2007,	reach-
es	adulthood,	the	rate	of	acceptance	of	heavy-handed	rule	will	start	to	decline	noticeably	
(OSW	interview	with	a	Chechen	political	scientist...,	op. cit.;	Муса Мусаев, От вайнахской 
































the	manifestations	of	which	consisted	 in	 the	unveiling,	on	 15	September	








functionaries	 of	 the	 Chechen	 Interior	Ministry	 can	 freely	move	 around	
Russia	bearing	arms	and	conducting	various	operations	without	notifying	
the	local	security	forces,	and	enjoy	de facto	impunity.95




94	 Депутат Госдумы требует проверить законность установки в Чечне памятника 
девушкам, погибшим во время Кавказской войны,	Kavkaz-uzel,	21.09.2013.	http://www.
kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/230424/.	On	3	December	2013	Zhuravlyov	was	physically	assaulted	
at	the	Duma	by	a	Chechen	deputy	Adam	Delimkhanov,	a	close	associate	of	Ramzan	Kadyrov.























violations	as	a	necessary	cost	of	 the	fight	against	 terrorism	(in	 the	years	




















ple	alone	until	the	Sochi	Olympics.	Сергей Канев, Москва-Юрт,	Новая Газета, 25.03.2013.	
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/57374.html
96	 After	hanging	up,	he	said	it	was	his	mother	calling.	A	video	of	this	incident	is	available	online.
97	 Паломники из Дагестана и Чечни готовятся к хаджу,	 Newsru.com,	 25.09.2013.	 http://
newsru.com/religy/25sep2013/hajj.html












































100	 Сергей Маркедонов, Кадыров и Евкуров: спор соседей в контексте „пограничных” 
проб лем, Caucasustimes.com, 13.08.2012. http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id = 
21063; Евкуров:  Су нженский район Ингушетии – неотъемлемая часть территории 





















exception	 was	 Ruslan	 Aushev,	 the	 first	 president	 of	 Ingushetia	 (1993-2002)	













omous	Republic	and	deported	 the	Chechens	and	 the	 Ingush	 to	Central	Asia,	
and	then,	following	the	return	of	the	two	nations	to	the	Caucasus,	restored	the	
country	but	with	different	borders.104	For	example	the	Prigorodny	District	near	
101	 Блиц-опрос “ДОШ”: при прямых выборах глав Дагестана и Ингушетии люди голосовали 
бы против всех кандидатов,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	 2.09.2013.	 https://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti-
cles/229389/.
	 According	 to	 the	 same	 source	 (the	Dosh quarterly	 published	 in	Moscow	 and	 in	Grozny),	
Yevkurov’s	approval	ratings	were	8.7%	in	2011	and	4.8%	in	2012.
102	 Евкуров поблагодарил представителей трех ингушских семей, простивших своих 
“кровников”,	Kavkaz-uzel,	15.03.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/221446/.
103	 Politicians,	 including	 the	Russian	State	Duma	deputy	Adam	Delimkhanov,	 accompanied	
the	 police	 officers.	 The	 raid	 was	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	 searching	 for	 Dokku	





















war).	 The	 village	 of	Arshty	 found	 itself	 in	 the	new	 republic	 Ingushetia	 (the	
smallest	Federation	subject	in	terms	of	territory)	after	the	1992	split	of	Chech-
en-Ingushetia,	 but	 the	 border	 between	 the	 two	 republics	was	 not	 precisely	





killed	 and	 171	 wounded	 in	 the	 republic	 (most	 of	 this	 number	 were	 victims	



























































The	history	of	Salafism	 in	Kabardino-Balkaria	dates	back	 to	 the	early	 1990s	
when	a	 group	of	 young	Muslims,	 graduates	 of	 religious	 schools	 in	 the	Arab	
states,	founded	the	Islamic	Centre.	It	has	been	conceived	as	an	alternative	to	




























the	republic,	especially	since	 the	 family	and	the	 inner	circle	of	 the	 former	
















107	 Wojciech	 Górecki,	 Przemiany	 islamu	 na	 Kaukazie	 Północno-Zachodnim	 w	 okresie	 po-
radzieckim.	 Adygeja,	 Karaczajo-Czerkiesja,	 Kabardyno-Bałkaria	 i	 Osetia	 Północna.	 in:	
































Like	Kabardino-Balkaria,	Karachay-Cherkessia	 is	often	 the	 scene	of	various	
frictions	between	 its	 titular	nations	 (Karachays,	 i.e.	Caucasus	Turks,	consti-
tute	a	majority	in	the	republic),	but	presently	the	clashes	are	usually	relatively	
mild.	A	serious	crisis	took	place	in	the	past,	on	the	occasion	of	the	1999	presi-
dential	 election,	 in	which	 the	Karachay	 candidate,	General	Vladimir	 Semy-
onov,	defeated	the	Cherkess,	Stanislav	Derev.	Derev	did	not	accept	defeat	and	
his	supporters	occupied	the	main	square	 in	the	republic’s	capital	 for	several	
weeks.	Karachay-Cherkessia	 is	 also	home	 to	 some	 closely-knit	 communities	
of	Abazins,	a	people	related	to	the	Abkhazians	(and	traditionally	close	to	the	
Cherkess),	and	of	Turkic	Nogais,	who	side	with	the	Karachays.






scene	of	 increasingly	 frequent	 conflicts	between	members	of	 the	Circassian	
nations	and	the	Armenians,	who	continue	to	grow	in	number	(Armenians	in	
the	North	Caucasus	report	higher	population	growth	rates	than	the	Kabardins	

























Krasnodar Krai (where	Sochi	is	 located)	has	witnessed	no	attacks	or	terror	
















































spontaneously,	or	within	 the	existing	Cossack	 formations,	as	 the	Krasnodar	
Krai	Cossacks	are	already	closely	co-operating	with	the	local	security	forces	
under	special	agreements116).	





changes	in	the	ethnic	composition	are	still	relatively	small.	Игорь Кармазин, Ставрополье 







respected,	 and	 for	 an	end	 to	 corruption	among	 the	 security	 service	 and	administration,	






self)	have	been	patrolling	towns	and	villages	alongside	the	police.	В Краснодарском крае 
казаки приступят к совместному с полицией патрулированию населенных пунктовб	
Kavkaz-uzel,	1.09.2012.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/211993/	
	 Since	 July	2013,	another	300	Cossacks	from	Krasnodar	Krai	have	been	taking	part	 in	op-
erations	 against	 illegal	 migrants	 along	 with	 the	 Federal	 Migration	 Service	 officers.	














Alexander	Tkachev,	 a	 close	 associate	 of	 President	 Putin,	who	was	 approved	
for	another	five-year	term	in	March	2012,	has	been	the	governor	of	Krasnod-










117	 The	 question	 of	 the	Olympic	 preparations	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 section	 on	Moscow’s	
strategies	towards	the	region.
118	 Jadwiga	Rogoża,	Flooding	in	the	Kuban:	a	natural	disaster	overshadowed	by	politics,	East-



































































Moscow	and	 force	others	 to	 leave	using	 administrative	methods).	Currently	
Baku’s	 focus	 is	on	supporting	the	Azerbaijani	national	minority	 in	southern	
Dagestan	(for	example,	an	Azerbaijani	theatre	operates	in	Derbent)	and	on	ef-
forts	to	neutralise	Russian	influence	on	the	Dagestani	diasporas	on	the	other	
side	of	 the	border	 (Baku	 fears	 that	Moscow	might	 fan	separatist	 sentiments	
and	radical	Islamic	ideas	among	the	Lezgians	and	Avars	living	in	Azerbaijan).	
In	2013,	at	the	initiative	of	Baku,	one	of	the	streets	in	Derbent	was	named	after	































































































































v. culTural aNd cIvIlISaTIONal chaNgES
The	 question	 of	 the	 cultural	 and	 civilisational	 changes	 that	 have	 been	 tak-
ing	 place	 in	 the	North	 Caucasus	 in	 recent	 years	 has	 already	 been	 signalled	
on	many	occasions	in	this	paper,	but	it	is	so	significant,	especially	for	the	fu-
ture	 of	 the	 region,	 that	 it	merits	 a	 separate	discussion.	The	most	 important	
























In	Kabardino-Balkaria,	 one	 of	 the	 symptoms	 of	 Islamisation	 consists	 in	 the	
decreasing	number	of	officially	 registered	marriages	 (instead	of	 formalising	
their	unions	at	registry	offices,	young	people	are	increasingly	being	married	













































encing	de-russification,	which	 involves	 the	Russian	 language	being	pushed	
out	by	the	Caucasus	languages,	and	the	level	of	Russian	language	competence	is	
129	 OSW	interview	with	a	researcher	from	Kabardino-Balkaria...,	op. cit.
130	 Заид Абдулагатов, О влиянии религиозного фактора на экстремистское поведение 
дагестанской молодежи, Социс,	Issue	1/2012,	p.	106–113	(article	available	online	at:	http://
www.isras.ru/files/File/Socis/2012_1/Abdulagatov.pdf).
131	 The	 transformations	 of	 the	 Caucasus	 customs	 and	 habits,	 which	 could	 even	 be	 termed	
a	“conservative	revolution”,	are	described	in	the	books	of	the	young	author	Alisa	Ganiyeva	


























The	proportion	of	 ethnic	Russians	 in	 the	 total	population	 is	declining	 in	all	
the	North	Caucasus	subjects	of	the	Russian	Federation	with	the	exception	of	






subject	 second	most	 affected	 by	 the	 process	 –	 its	 ethnic	Russian	 population	
has	decreased	from	24,641	people,	or	13.25%,	in	1989	to	3,215	people,	or	0.78%,	






much	as	possible	 is	 the	dominant	view	among	the	ruling	elites	of	 the	North	




















































es	 (lezginka)	are	 treated	almost	as	demonstrations	of	aggression	or	superiority”.	 (Ислам 
Текушев, Теракт. А в ответ тишина...,	Caucasustimes.com,	 26.01.2011.	http://www.cauca-
sustimes.com/article.asp?id=20735).
138	 Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения	 (Russian	 Public	 Opinion	 Re-
search	Centre).


































vI. ThE NOrTh caucaSuS IN MOScOw’S POlIcIES
1. Strategies towards the region
Moscow	has	not	developed	any	cohesive	strategy	for	the	region	over	the	more	
than	twenty	years	following	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union.	during boris 
Yeltsin’s rule (1991–1999) its policies were reactive:	any	measures	that	were	
taken	were	 in	 response	 to	 events	 in	 the	 region	 (starting	 the	 First	 Chechen	
War	to	combat	separatists	was	an	example	of	this	reactive	approach).	during 
vladimir Putin’s two terms as president (2000–2008) russia implement-




high	cost	of	 this	 strategy	and	 the	absence	of	any	visible	 results,	 i.e.	 the	 fact	
that	Moscow	failed	to	establish	full	control	of	the	region,	 led	the	Kremlin	to	
adopt	a	slightly	more	flexible	policy	(the	above-mentioned	policy	of	Chechenisa-
tion,	 implemented	since	mid-2002).	dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) tried to 







embezzled.	 Moreover,	 many	 of	 the	 investments	 were	 aimed	 at	 developing	
tourism	while	the	demand	for	tourist	services	in	the	region	was	negligible	due	
to	the	threat	of	terror	attacks.	launched at the onset of Putin’s third presi-
dential term in 2012, the current policy is a combination of the Medve-
dev approach, i.e. a continuation of the existing financial programmes 
supplemented by new ones that are launched, and ad hoc measures aimed 




































existing	 in	 the	 North	 Caucasus,	 especially	 ethnic	 divisions.143	 Moscow	 also	
approaches	the	North	Caucasus	with	distrust	or	even	fear,	which	is	visible	in	
the	fact	that	military	draft	 is	very	limited	in	the	region:	only	single	soldiers	
from	Dagestan	or	 Ingushetia	make	 it	 to	 the	Russian	army,	and	the	Ministry	









143	 One	researcher	even	mentions	a	“dictatorship	of	parities”,	 i.e.	 the	conviction	that	all	 the	
Caucasus	nations	should	have	proportional	representation	in	the	local	government.	State-
ment	by	a	Russian	expert...,	op. cit.	One	example	of	 the	 strengthening	of	particularisms	





144	 Сергей Маркедонов: отказ от призыва в армию уроженцев Кавказа говорит о не-





















of	 the	fight	against	 terrorism.	 It	 is	 the	 federal	agencies	which	are	primarily	
responsible	for	this,	anyway.	It	also	appears	that	at	the	level	of	the	republics	







































































of	 Ingushetia.	The	aim	of	 the	development	 strategy	 currently	being	 implemented	 in	 the	
republic	 is	to	reduce	this	figure	to	80%,	but	this	seems	hardly	to	be	realistic	(Екатерина 
Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет...,	op. cit.).
148	 The	report	“Кто кого кормит?”	(“Who` s	feeding	whom?”)	published	by	the	Lenta.ru	portal	
noted	 that	 the	financial	 relations	between	 the	North	Caucasus	republics	and	 the	 federal	
government	were	one	of	the	prime	examples	of	the	lack	of	transparency	in	Russia` s	budget	
policy	(http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/12/14/enough/).























































153	 Петр Нетреба, Дмитрий Бутрин, Премьер-министру показали горы проблем, Ком-



























2. Operation Sochi 2014










Кавказа могли бы сэкономить на автомобилях для чиновников, 1prime.ru,	 19.08.2013.	
http://1prime.ru/Politics/20130819/765663024.html
154	 Муса Мурадов, Северному Кавказу укажут новое направление, Коммерсантъ, 10.09.2013.	
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2275567	
	 In	December	2011,	while	he	was	still	prime	minister,	Vladimir	Putin	said	that	cutting	in-






































most	 influential	politician	 in	 the	region	after	Kadyrov.	Amirov	was	accused	
of	having	contracted	a	murder,	and	after	several	months	of	investigation,	also	
of	terrorism	and	arms	trafficking.157	He	was	arrested	in	a	dramatic	operation	














of	 the	North	 Caucasus	 Resorts	 company	 (ОАО „Курорты Северного Кавказа”) (Максим 
Гликин, Светлана Бочарова, Максим Товкайло, Развитие Кавказа стало семейным 
делом,	Vedomosti.ru,	 15.05.2013.	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/12025491/kavka-
zskij_klan_hloponina









































158	 На время проведения Олимпиады в Сочи будут запрещены митинги,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	
24.08.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/228995/;	Лев Левинсон: в Сочи на время 
Олимпиады вводится режим чрезвычайного положения,	Kavkaz-uzel,	24.08.2013.	http://
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229015/
159	 The	Sochi	Operational	Group	includes	two	spetsnaz	brigades	of	the	Southern	Military	Dis-
trict:	the	22nd	Brigade	and	the	10th	Brigade.	Алексей Михайлов, К защите Олимпиады в Сочи 
подключился армейский спецназ,	Izvestia.ru,	26.02.2013.	http://izvestia.ru/news/543324
160	 Колокольцев: МВД направит на Олимпиаду в Сочи дополнительные силы, Kavkaz-uzel,	
30.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232575/




































162	 В Сочи с 10 сентября начинает работу комиссия по обнаружению нелегальных 
мигрантов,	Kavkaz-uzel,	 2.09.2013.	 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229406/;	 Human	
Rights	 Watch	 призвала МОК обратить внимание на задержания мигрантов в Сочи,	
Kavkaz-uzel,	3.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231057/ 
163	 Ткачев: ФМС Кубани выявила в Сочи 1800 «резиновых квартир», в каждой числятся 
более 10 человек, Kavkaz-uzel,	23.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232155/
164	 For	information	about	the	cost	of	the	Olympics,	see	e.g.	Wacław	Radziwinowicz,	Igrzyska	
oligarchijskie,	Gazeta Wyborcza,	28.10.2013.

































ports	 (the	 local	hub	 in	Mineralnye	Vody),	 the	sea	ports	of	Novorossiysk	and	














Eastweek	 OSW,	 28.08.2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-08-28/























underground	would	 further	 strengthen	 Kadyrov’s	 position	 against	Moscow	















situation	 in	 the	final	decades	of	 the	 19th	 century	when	 the	 region’s	 informal	
status	was	that	of	an	internal	Russian	colony.	In	the	Soviet	period	the	region	






















































168	 In	 late	October	 2013	 Lev	Gudkov,	 director	 of	 the	 Levada	Centre,	 said	 he	 believed	Russia	
was	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 carrying	 out	 pogroms.	 Глава „Левада-Центра”: Россия находится 
в предпогромном состоянии – вопрос лишь, где рванет,	Kavkaz-uzel,	 25.10.2013.	http://
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232217/















































In	 the	run-up	 to	 the	Olympics,	Moscow (the federal government of rus-
sia) will	focus	on	ensuring	the	security	of	the	Games,	and	subsequently	will	






















budget).	 This	 strategy	 requires	money,	 but	 force-based	methods	 (the	 “first	
Putin”	strategy	as	a	potential	alternative	 to	 the	current	approach)	are	also	








































expected,	however,	 that,	 following	 the	Olympics,	Moscow	will	become	more	
determined	in	its	efforts	to	curb	the	most	glaring	cases	of	abuse	of	power	and	
corruption.
In	 the	 foreseeable	 future	neither	azerbaijan nor georgia will	play	a	major	
role	in	the	Caucasus.	However,	Abkhazia	may	play	such	a	role	on	a	small	scale	




for	 instance	 organise	 larger-scale	 resettlement	 programmes	 for	 Circassians	
from	the	Middle	East	(who	can	freely	travel	to	Russia	once	they	have	Abkhaz-
ian	passports).








































The author would like to thank Ewa Fischer and Katarzyna Jarzyńska 
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Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground  
in the north Caucasus in the years 2010-2012, broken down by republic
victims of acts of terrorism and clashes 
with the armed underground in the 
North caucasus in the years 2010-2012
2010 2011 2012
Dagestan
Killed 378 413 405
Wounded 307 411 290
Chechnya
Killed 127 95 82
Wounded 123 106 92
Ingushetia
Killed 134 70 84
Wounded 192 38 83
North	Ossetia
Killed 24 4 7
Wounded 171 10 7
Kabardino-Balkaria
Killed 79 129 107
Wounded 82 44 49
Karachay-Cherkessia
Killed 2 22 5
Wounded 2 12 2
Stavropol	Krai
Killed 10 17 10
Wounded 79 7 2
Total North caucasus
Killed 754 750 700
Wounded 956 628 525















Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground  




































































Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground  
in the north Caucasus in 2013
victims of acts of terrorism 
and clashes with the armed 
underground in the North 
caucasus in 2013
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Dagestan
Killed 10 31 26 22 38 26 23 no	data 32
Wounded 14 12 15 13 91 17 8 no	data 26
Chechnya
Killed 14 0 6 3 1 2 4 no	data 4
Wounded 8 2 7 6 1 15 7 no	data 8
Ingushetia
Killed 0 5 7 8 3 0 2 no	data 2
Wounded 0 13 1 14 8 6 2 no	data 4
North	Ossetia
Killed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Wounded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Kabardino-Balkaria
Killed 12 1 7 1 3 9 13 no	data 6
Wounded 1 1 0 0 2 4 1 no	data 0
Karachay-Cherkessia
Killed 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Wounded 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Stavropol	Krai
Killed 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 no	data 0
Wounded 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 no	data 0
Total North caucasus
Killed 39 37 47 34 45 39 46 42 44
Wounded 23 28 25 33 102 43 19 34 38
























ethnic Russians in selected republics of the north Caucasus  
























Dagestan 1,802,579 165,940 9.2% 2,910,249 104,020 3.57%
Chechnya* 1,084,433 269,130 24.82% 1,268,989 24,382 1.92%
Ingushetia** 185,996 24,641 13.25% 412,529 3,215 0.78%
North	Ossetia 632,428 189,159 29.9% 712,980 147,090 20.63%
Kabardino-
Balkaria

















abberviations: N. O. − North Ossetia; S. O. − South Ossetia; INg. − Ingushetia
